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Comment on 
European banking, Past, Present, and Future 
by Harry Huizinga1  
Tilburg University and European Commission 
 
Reviewing two decades of data, Dermine by and large paints a picture of increasing 
banking market integration in Europe. Lower costs of cross-border payments, increased 
cross-border deposit holdings by non-financial depositors, and higher market shares of 
foreign banks all points towards the emergence of a full-fledged European banking 
market. Foreign banks, however, primarily take the form of subsidiaries rather than 
branches (as measured by assets, see Dermine’s Table 9). This is surprising, as one 
expects branches to be simpler and cheaper to operate than subsidiaries. Banks may all 
the same prefer subsidiaries, if these produce a relatively low tax and regulatory burden 
for them. This would again be surprising, as the Second Banking Directive of 1989 grants 
a branched international bank the deemed benefit of being able to operate throughout the 
EU under the single home-country regulation and supervision. At any rate, the 
prominence of international subsidiaries, subject to host country control, suggests that 
relatively little has changed since the early 1980s when host country control still 
characterised all cross-border bank regulation and supervision.  
In my comments, I first summarise how the assignment of the main banking policy 
responsibilities to home and host countries differs for branches and subsidiaries. Then I 
review some of the policy-related reasons why banks may prefer subsidiaries, as 
mentioned in Dermine’s section 2. A potentially important, although difficult to quantify, 
influence on the overall tax and regulatory burden on banks is the expected value of a 
public bailout in case of financial distress.  Second, I go somewhat beyond the scope of  
Dermine’s paper to examine how the revealed preference for subsidiaries affects tax and 
regulatory policy interdependence in Europe. The dominance of subsidiaries may at 
present have a dampening effect on tax and regulatory competition in the EU, even if 
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there are signs that such competition is eroding the overall tax and regulatory burden on 
EU banks. Policy proposals, such as Dermine’ call for involving EU-level institutions in 
international financial crisis management, should be evaluated as to whether they help to 
bring about the ‘right’ overall tax and regulatory burden in the EU. 
   
The assignment of banking policy responsibilities in the EU 
Subject to EU directives, countries independently set key aspects of bank regulation, such 
as the precise nature of their deposit insurance systems and their corporate tax and VAT 
policies. Policy- making responsibilities are divided differently between home and host 
countries for international branches and subsidiaries (see also Mayes and Vesala (2001)).  
As seen in Table 1, branches are subject to home country control for the main bank 
regulation and supervision categories of capital adequacy, other prudential regulation 
(such as large exposure rules), and deposit insurance. The provision of liquidity 
assistance is a main exception, as it is the primary responsibility of the national or host 
country central bank. In case of financial distress, the supervisor who exercises 
consolidated control, i.e. the home country supervisor, will be the co-ordinating 
supervisor, and the home country treasury presumably is first in line to contribute risk 
capital and other types of support to a distressed international bank with branches. In 
practice, the co-ordinating supervisor is likely to call upon the host country treasury to 
contribute to a bailout, if a substantial share of  a bank’s business is conducted through 
branches in the host country. The bailout of an international bank with branches thus may 
turn out to be a mixed responsibility.   
Responsibilities are also mixed in the area of corporate income taxation. The host country 
has a first right to tax the income of any branches operating within its territory, but the 
home country generally also subjects any foreign-source income generated by its 
international branches to taxation. To mitigate the double taxation of cross-border bank 
income, the home country may provide the parent bank with foreign tax credits or 
deductions from taxable income for host-country taxes. The VAT is mostly a 
responsibility of the host country. Specifically, financial services undergo the VAT of the 
‘production’ country. The host country in fact does not charge VAT on financial-sector 
output, but instead requires banks within its territory to produce financial services with 
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intermediate and capital inputs that are VAT-paid in the host country (this is the essence 
of the current VAT-exemption of financial services in the EU).  
For subsidiaries, the picture is entirely different as seen in Table 1. In fact, a subsidiary is 
subject primarily to the regulatory and supervisory regime of the host country. In case of 
financial distress, the host country supervisor is the co-ordinating supervisor and the host 
country treasury is first in line to provide public financial support. Responsibilities in the 
case of corporate income taxation and VAT are largely the same as before, even if there 
may be differences in their implementation that may affect the choice between branches 
and subsidiaries.  
 
Should an international bank opt for a branch and a subsidiary ? 
In choosing between a branch and a subsidiary, a bank presumably aims for the highest 
profit to be achieved by the lowest total tax and regulatory burden. In doing so, banks 
will realise the quasi-fiscal nature of a large part of bank regulation and supervision. 
Deposit insurance is a rather direct quasi-fiscal measure, for instance, as it combines a 
tax-like insurance premium with a (public) deposit guarantee. Bank regulation and 
supervision that affect bank stability also have fiscal implications, as they affect the 
chance of gaining access to deposit-insurance funds or even to tax payers’ money in case 
of a public bail-out. Public bailouts, when they occur, are fiscal transfers to the banking 
system that reduce the overall tax and regulatory burden on banking. Hence, banks need 
to determine which legal structure implies the lowest combined tax and regulatory burden 
on their international activities.  
Dermine mentions the different corporate tax treatments of branches and subsidiaries as 
determinants of the legal-structure choice. Specifically, international banks are more 
likely to receive cross-border loss-compensation for foreign branches than for 
subsidiaries in calculating the parent company’s tax liability. This is true, as member 
states generally provide immediate loss-compensation in the case of branches, while only 
two member states (Denmark and France) do so for subsidiaries (see European 
Commission (2001a)). This asymmetric tax treatment of branches and subsidiaries, 
however, tends to favour branches, and hence cannot explain the preference for 
subsidiaries. All the same, the limited loss-compensation of foreign subsidiaries is a 
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serious barrier to cross-border investments. As part of its strategy in the area of company 
taxation, the European Commission (2001b) has announced its intention to table 
legislative measures to improve loss-compensation availability for cross-border activities 
by the end of 2003. The best solution to this problem would be the introduction of a 
common tax base for internationally active companies and groups of companies. Such a 
common tax base for company taxation in Europe is a long-term goal of the European 
Commission (2001b).  
Dermine also mentions that the tax system may discourage the creation of an 
international network of branches through mergers and acquisitions, if such corporate 
restructurings trigger the imposition of capital gains taxes (on the assets of the acquired 
firm). The Merger Directive of 1990, however, has been created to preclude the 
imposition of capital gains taxes precisely in these circumstances. Thus, the prospect of 
additional capital gains taxes should not categorically deter the creation of internationally 
branched banks. In specific circumstances, the Merger Directive, as it stands, may not be 
able to prevent the imposition of capital gains taxes as it, for instance, precisely 
delineates the legal forms of companies to which it applies. This means that companies 
under a legal form that did not exist in 1990 cannot benefit. Short-comings of this nature 
should be eliminated, and the European Commission (2001b) intends to propose 
amendments to extend the Merger Directive in 2003.  
Corporate income taxation, in summary, my affect legal structure in specific cases, but it 
is unclear that it can explain a general tendency for international banks to prefer 
subsidiaries. The VAT equally cannot explain a general tendency to prefer either 
branches or subsidiaries.  
How do bank regulation and supervision affect the legal structure of international 
banking operations? These areas of banking policy are potentially important, as the 
distinction between branches and subsidiaries in this respect appears to be most 
pronounced: branches, roughly, are the joint responsibility of home and host country 
supervisors, while subsidiaries are mainly the responsibility of host country supervisors. 
As a result, branches may well end up with a relatively high net tax and regulatory 
burden, in parallel to the ‘problem of the commons’. This would explain why banks 
choose to establish subsidiaries.  
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Does bank regulation and supervision really put higher burdens on branches than on 
subsidiaries? Dermine mentions that the cost of deposit insurance can affect the legal 
structure choice, as branches (subsidiaries) contract deposit insurance in the home (host) 
country. Deposit insurance premiums are not regulated by the EU Deposit Insurance 
Directive of 1994, and in practice differ widely in Europe (see Table 2).  Deposit 
insurance thus is likely to be a key factor in any legal structure choice, even if these 
premium differences cannot explain the observed general preference for subsidiaries. 
Finally, we should consider how the prospective behaviour of banking authorities during 
crisis management may affect the choice between branches and subsidiaries. Banking 
crises tend to be very costly to national governments. The potential costs of a major bank 
failure in Europe are confirmed by Dermine’s calculations of the size of the capital of 
large banks relative to GDP in his Table 16. History also shows that the public cost of 
resolving a banking crisis can be substantial. In the last three decades alone, Finland, 
Spain and Sweden have all seen systemic banking crises, each with a cost of between 5 
and 8 percent of GDP (see Table 3).  The large public outlays at times of financial crisis 
imply that financial crisis resolution is a major factor in determining the overall tax and 
regulatory burden on the banking system. 
The Directive on the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions of 2001 states that the bankruptcy 
laws of the home country apply in case of a bankruptcy of a bank with international 
branches and, more importantly, that all the bank’s creditors have to be treated equally.  
A bank with an international branch network tends to have international creditors, which 
makes paying off these creditors an international public good. Decentralised crisis 
management concerning an international bank with branches would naturally lead to an 
underprovision of this public good, and hence a lower chance of a generous bailout 
following distress. 
European policy makers are only recently focusing their full attention on the potential 
problems of international financial crisis management in Europe. Economic and Financial 
Committee (2001), specifically, lays out the responsibilities and duties of the 
international authorities concerned (supervisors, central banks, and national treasuries). 
The home country supervisor is the co-ordinator policy-maker for a distressed 
international bank with branches, while the host country supervisor co-ordinates policy 
towards a subsidiary in crisis. An adequate flow of information among public institutions 
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is crucial, especially in the case of a branched firm. Currently, the bilateral exchange of 
supervisory information is usually arranged in Memoranda of Understanding, but these 
MoU’s generally do not cover the special information needs in case of a financial crisis. 
Enria and Vesala (forthcoming) discuss the standardisation of MoU’s in the EU and 
binding commitments to exchange information as avenues to improve the flow of 
information among national authorities. Efforts along these lines, however, face the 
difficulty that the information required to resolve the next financial crisis may be difficult 
to define in advance and that international agreements to exchange supervisory 
information are difficult to enforce.  
In practice, national authorities, therefore, are likely to retain some discretion in each 
financial crisis regarding the information to be shared. Presumably, national authorities 
will use this discretion to affect the outcome of the crisis management in their favour. 
Thus there is a tension between a co-operative supervisory model with unhampered 
information exchange in the EU and national incentives to keep their domestic public 
outlays at a minimum.   
The asymmetric information and divergent interests that characterise international 
financial crisis management suggest that the tools of game theory could be useful to help 
predict crisis management outcomes. Ideally, we wish to know how international crisis 
management would differ from purely domestic crisis management in whether a bank is 
allowed to fail and, if not, what would be the timing, the amount, and the sharing of the 
public money provided.  
In this vein, Holthausen and Rønde (2001) consider bank closure decisions in a two-
country model where the home and host country authorities have different incentives to 
rescue an international bank, as the home-country deposit insurance agency also covers 
deposits in the host country. Bank supervisors in the two countries receive independent 
‘signals’ about the quality of the bank’s assets. The host country has to decide whether to 
reveal its information to the home country cognisant of how information exchange may 
affect the home country’s closure decision. Holthausen and Rønde (2001) conclude that 
the home country supervisor may err on the side of closing down a bank either too early 
or too late. 
Erroneous closure timing decisions are likely to imply inappropriate amounts of money 
spent to resolve a financial crisis. Holthausen and Rønde (2001) do not explicitly address 
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the cost aspect of crisis resolution, but the presumption is that decentralised financial 
crisis management leads to too little money spent on average to resolve a crisis. The main 
reason, as indicated, is that the Directive on the Winding-Up of Credit Institutions does 
not allow national authorities to discriminate against foreign creditors in a publicly 
financed bank bailout.  Any moneys spent in crisis resolution by a national treasury thus 
have to benefit the bank’s national and foreign creditors equally.  
The expectation that decentralised crisis management leads to an underprovision of funds 
is strengthened, if we note that international financial crisis management is a rare event 
that finds changing sets of countries at the negotiating table. Hence, there is unlikely to be 
the kind of repeated interaction that would allow countries to build a reputation for being 
a good partner in financial crisis containment by contributing generously to financial 
crisis resolution. 
The balance sheets of subsidiaries, unlike those of international banks with branches, 
primarily reflect local deposits and perhaps borrowing in the local capital market. This 
type of geographical concentration of the bank’s creditors and presumably also of its loan 
customers provides the host country authorities with relatively strong incentives to bail 
out the subsidiaries of international banks. In summary, the presumption that subsidiaries 
are treated relatively favourably in an international financial crisis may be a factor leading 
banks to prefer subsidiaries to branches. 
 
How does a preference for subsidiaries affect policy interdependence ? 
The degree of banking policy interdependence regarding cross-border banking is affected, 
first, by the international assignment of policy responsibilities (i.e., the issue of home 
country control vs. host country control) and, second, by the strength of international 
linkages regarding trade in financial services and international credit exposures. This is 
represented schematically in Table 4. This table distinguishes between the cases where (i)  
(all) international bank operations are organised as branches (and hence are subject to 
home country control) and (ii)  as subsidiaries (and hence are subject to host country 
control). Also,  a distinction is made between (i) the presence of substantial trade and 
financial linkages internationally and (ii) no such linkages. From the table, it is apparent 
that there is no banking policy interdependence if there is host country control and there 
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exist no international linkages. In every other case, there is some kind of policy 
interdependence. Two types of policy interdependence can now be distinguished: 
 policy interdependence stemming from the interaction of foreign branches 
(subject to home country control) and domestic firms (subject to their home 
country control) in the host market, 
and  
 policy interdependence stemming from the interaction of national banking 
systems (subject to their home country control) in the international market place. 
The prominence of subsidiaries tends to weaken policy interdependence of the first kind. 
Policy interaction regarding banks operating in the same banking market or in the 
international banking market differs, and hence it is useful to sketch the two types of 
policy interdependence separately as done below.  
 
Policy interdependence within a single banking market 
As already mentioned, policy makers need to co-ordinate their actions to resolve a 
financial crises involving the foreign branches of an international bank. A second aspect 
of banking policy affected by the presence of foreign branches is deposit insurance. 
Foreign branches are subject to the deposit insurance scheme of their home country and 
hence pay the deposit insurance premium charged by the home country deposit insurance 
scheme. This implies that a low deposit insurance premium can be an effective tool to aid 
the foreign branches of domestic parent banks in their competition with banks in the host 
country. Banks subject to a low deposit insurance premium will be able to pass on this 
advantage to their deposits in the form of higher deposit interest rates, which should 
allow them to capture market share.  
Huizinga and Nicodème (2002) report regression results indicating that the deposit 
insurance premium and other deposit insurance system features affect the location of 
bank deposits internationally. This suggests that deposit insurance can be an effective 
instrument of banking system competition for at least international customers. Regulatory 
competition in the area of deposit insurance could be considered undesirable if it leads to 
deposit insurance premiums that are too low given the expected liabilities of the deposit 
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insurance scheme. To check this, Laeven (2002) calculates ‘fair’ deposit insurance 
premiums for a large set of countries using several methods and compares these with 
actual premiums. Deposit insurance premiums in Germany – both public and private – 
appear to be less than what would be fair. In Austria, Italy, Luxembourg and the 
Netherlands, however, the deposit insurance assessment is contingent on losses occurring 
in the system, which complicates Laeven’s analysis. Ex post assessment would generally 
occur at times when the banking system is under severe stress, and hence may turn out to 
be impracticable. This suggests that countries with ex post assessment may subsidise 
their banks through cheap deposit insurance. 
Tax policies, and in particular corporate income taxes and the VAT, appear to be ill-
suited as instruments to affect the competition between foreign branches and domestic 
banks in the same banking market. These instruments tend to be too blunt to distinguish 
between domestic and foreign banks.  
All the same, foreign banks may in practice face lower corporate income, and perhaps 
VAT burdens, if they have relatively ample opportunity to reduce host-country taxes 
through the manipulation of international transfer prices. There is some evidence that 
foreign banks in the EU indeed face lower taxes than domestic banks. Specifically,  
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga find that foreign banks in 5 EU member states (Austria, 
Belgium, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) pay significantly lower taxes than 
domestic institutions using bank-level data for the 1988-1995 period (these results are 
reproduced in Table 5). This finding may be due to the ample profit shifting opportunities 
available to foreign banks or it may reflect that foreign banking operations are relatively 
unprofitable – perhaps due to insufficient information about foreign market conditions.  
Policy interdependence in the international banking market 
Banking systems have to compete in the international banking market, if bank customers 
are willing to turn to banks located abroad for their banking services. Similarly, banking 
policies will have international repercussions, if banks are linked internationally by way 
of significant credit exposures or cross-holdings of shares. Hence, a recurring question 
regarding international banking policies is whether and to what extent the European 
banking market is already integrated.  This was a main question in the report by the 
Economic and Financial Committee (2000) on financial stability, and it is a pervasive 
theme of the Dermine paper.  
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The Economic and Financial Committee (2000) reports that large European banks obtain 
38 of their income from foreign sources (with equal shares from Europe/EU and non-
Europe/EU). As further evidence of bank market integration, Galati and Tsatsaronis 
(2001) report that international bank claims inside the euro area rose from a plateau of 
around $ 650 billion in the 1995-97 period to more than $ 900 billion after 1999. 
Consistent with this, Dermine reports that the costs of cross-border payments have come 
down on average between 1993 and 2000, although they remain high in some instances 
(Dermine’s Table 6). The recent work by Berger et al (2002) showing that the foreign 
affiliates of multinational firms tend to prefer local banks to do their cash management, 
however, suggests bank market integration is still far from complete. Evidence like this 
can be used to conclude that banking market integration is already substantial in Europe, 
or conversely that banking market integration is not yet on a scale as perhaps anticipated 
before. Regardless, bank market integration in Europe is almost certain to increase 
substantially in the decades to come. Hence, it makes sense to anticipate the days when 
bank market integration will be much advanced. 
Are there signs that national authorities adjust their policies towards banking to attract the 
foot-loose international banking customers? One area where international bank 
competition may already have affected policy is the VAT. To see how countries could 
compete in this area, it is necessary to briefly review the VAT treatment of financial 
services in the EU. According to the Sixth VAT Directive of 1977, most financial 
services – such as depositing and lending - are exempt from normal VAT, which is to say 
that no VAT is assessed on the value of these services. To compensate for the absence of 
a VAT on bank output, banks cannot claim VAT input credits for the VAT embodied in 
the prices of their purchased intermediate and (physical) capital inputs either. Thus, the 
VAT-exemption of most financial services in the EU effectively replaces a VAT on 
bank-level output with a VAT on some bank-level inputs (intermediate inputs and 
physical capital inputs). 
Some financial services, such as safe keeping and advisory services, remain subject to 
normal VAT on the output, while VAT-inputs are granted for the inputs used. Most 
banks produce a combination of exempt financial services and normally taxed financial 
services. As VAT input credits in principle are only available for inputs used to produce 
normally taxed financial services, banks in practice have to determine which share of a 
bank’s inputs is used to produce exempt financial services and which share is used to 
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produce taxable financial services. Guidelines on how to do this are difficult to comply 
with, and even more difficult to enforce for VAT administrations.  
The inherent ambiguities in current VAT administration provide the tax authorities with 
some discretion to determine the effective level of VAT on their banking systems – 
independently of the statutory VAT rate relevant for the overall economy. They seem to 
use this discretion to impose rather low effective VAT on their banking systems (see 
Huizinga (2002)). In particular, the VAT input credits granted to banks in Europe in 
practice appear to be much higher than expected on the basis of actual input use (see 
Table 6).  
This finding may to some extent result from effective political pressure by banks, but the 
most logical explanation is that tax administrators choose low effective VAT on their 
banking systems to give domestic banks a competitive advantage in their competition 
with banks located abroad. The VAT may be a better instrument to achieve this goal than 
the corporate income tax, as it is difficult to use the corporate income tax to affect the 
effective level of taxation of the banking sector or any other particular sector for that 
matter.  
 
The tax and regulatory burden on EU banking: past, present and future. 
Taking a similarly long view as Dermine, what can we say about the development of the 
tax and regulatory burden on banking in the EU?   
Starting with the early 1980s, many European countries still made use of very restrictive 
financial regulation in the form of controls of interest rates, capital controls and 
mandatory investment restrictions (see Dermine’s Table 1). Such measures have the 
effect of forcing domestic savers to accept below-market interest rates offered by 
domestically located financial institutions, which in turn are left to invest in domestic 
securities and, in particular, in domestic government debt. Financial repression of this 
kind thus allows governments to finance their debts relatively cheaply, implying a 
relatively high implicit taxation of savings and of the financial system. Hence, Europe’s 
banking system entered the 1980s in a state of overtaxation and overregulation. 
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Due to financial liberalisation and banking market integration, the picture may well be 
exactly opposite in the future. Low deposit insurance premiums and a low VAT on 
banking already contribute to a relatively low tax and regulatory burden on banking in the 
EU at present. Banks’ preferences for subsidiaries currently may serve to dampen 
banking system competition somewhat, enabling policy makers to sustain somewhat 
higher tax and regulatory burdens than would otherwise be possible. The trend towards 
globalisation, however, is likely to continue and hence the competition-dampening 
influence of subsidiaries may turn out to be temporary. Of course, regarding the future 
there are several important unknowns. 
One uncertainty concerns the future course of EU banking policies. Will EU policy 
makers be able to find a middle ground between over- and undertaxation and regulation? 
Some level of systems competition, subject to appropriate EU-wide common tax and 
regulatory standards, should be able to produce the desired outcome (analogous to the 
analysis of Edwards and Keen (1996) who show that some limited tax competition may 
produce appropriate levels of taxation).  
In the future, there may be a greater danger of erring on the side of too little taxation and 
regulation than too much. Hence, it is desirable to critically review those areas where at 
present EU banking directives leave countries with some discretion to see whether this 
discretion is used to lower regulatory burdens too much. Perhaps a useful role in this 
review can be played by any newly created EU-wide committees dealing with EU 
banking regulations that are currently under discussion in the ECOFIN (see the press 
release of Economic and Financial Council (2002)). Such committees would be along the 
lines of the two committees presently dealing with securities markets regulation – the 
European Securities Committee and the Committee of European Securities Regulators – 
created in 2001 following the recommendations of the Committee of Wise Men under the 
chairmanship of Lamfalussy (see European Commission (2001c)). 
An example of a policy to be reviewed by committees along these lines would be the 
assessment of deposit insurance premiums in the EU. Such a review could lead to the 
recommendation of a minimum deposit insurance premium. Any increases in quasi-fiscal 
revenues gained in this way could in part be used to build or strengthen a deposit 
insurance fund and, beyond a certain level, be turned over to national treasuries. Another 
area to consider for the EU is reform of the current VAT treatment of financial services. 
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Reform could make the operation of the banking system more efficient and, in addition, it 
would yield positive VAT revenue in the EU of around ¼ELOOLRQDQQXDOO\LILWOHDGVWR
the application of standard-level VAT on the banking sector (see Huizinga (2002)). 
An important final issue, also considered by Dermine, is how to assign policy-making 
responsibility in the case of an international banking crisis. Dermine favours decision-
making at the European level; specifically, he suggests that the appropriate forum would 
be a joint meeting of the ECOFIN and the ECB. Such a European approach to financial 
crisis management has the benefit that the EU-wide repercussions of any crisis resolution 
are likely to be taken into account, and that decision-making is more likely to be based on 
a broad set of relevant information.  
The internalisation of international externalities in the EU by itself is likely to lead to a 
more generous provision of public funds in times of financial crisis. Conversely, the 
transfer of crisis management responsibilities to an EU forum can help control the cost of 
crisis management, if EU-level decision makers are less responsive to national banking 
interests. Also, EU-wide financial crisis managers may in practice encounter financial 
crisis more often than their national counterparts at present. Hence, EU-level financial 
crisis authorities may be better able to build a reputation for being tough on distressed 
banks. Toughness of this kind is desirable as it provides bank managers with appropriate 
incentives to keep bank-level risk in check. On net, an EU body thus may do a better or a 
worse job of keeping the expectations of bailout support low in the minds of bank 
managers. 
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Table 1.  Assignment of banking policy responsibilities for international banking  
 
    Host country control  Home country control  Mix 
A. Branches 
Capital adequacy      X 
Other prudential regulation     X 
Deposit insurance      X 
Liquidity assistance   X                                                                                                                        
Treasury support in case 
of distress       X  or   X 
Corporate income tax           X 
VAT     X 
 
B. Subsidiaries 
Capital adequacy   X 
Other prudential regulation  X 
Deposit insurance   X 
Liquidity assistance   X  
Treasury support in case 
of distress    X 
Corporate income tax           X 
VAT     X 
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Assessment Base Annual premium in percent 
Austria  Insured deposits Pro rata, ex post 
Belgium Insured  deposits 0.02 plus 0.04 if necessary 
Denmark Insured deposits 0.2 (maximum) 
 
Finland Insured deposits 0.05 to 0.3 
France Deposits plus 1/3 
 Loans 
Risk-adjusted 
Germany Insured deposits 0.008 (statutory scheme); 
0-0.1 (private sector) 
Greece Deposits      Decreasing by size: 0.0025 to 0.125 
Ireland Insured deposits 0.2 
Italy Insured deposits Ex post, adjusted for size and risk 
Luxembourg Insured deposits Ex post to a maximum of 5% of capital 
Netherlands Insured deposits Ex post to a maximum of 10 % of capital 
Portugal Insured deposits 0.08 to 0.12 
Spain  Insured deposits 0.1 (maximum of 0.2) 
Sweden Insured deposits 0.5  (maximum) 
United 
Kingdom 
Insured deposits On demand, not to exceed 0.3 
Source : Laeven (2002, Annex) 
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 Period Cost of recapitalisation 
(percent of GDP) 
Finland  1991 - 93  8 
Spain 1977 – 85 5.6 
Sweden 1991 6.4 
Source :  Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) 
 
 
Table  4.    Is there banking policy interdependence ? 
 
 
 Host country control Home country control 
International trade and 
financial linkages  
Yes Yes 
No linkages No Yes 
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Table  5.     Impact of foreign ownership on taxes 
 
The dependent variable is taxes paid as a percentage of assets.  Regressions also includes 
equity, loans, fixed assets, customer and short term funding and other interest-bearing 
funding (all divided by assets) and time dummies all of which are not reported.  The 




Foreign Dummy   




Austria  - .087** 
 (.037) 
. 39  58 
Belgium -. 078** 
 (. 033) 
. 12 178 
 
Denmark  . 215 
 (. 193) 
. 37 176 
France -. 039 
 (. 031) 
. 10 391 
Germany -. 046 
 (. 055) 
. 35 140 
Greece  . 152 
(.095)  
.24 70 
Ireland  -.092 
 (. 116) 
. 90   9 
Italy -. 238 *** 
(. 077) 
 .30 219 
Luxembourg  . 027 
(. 024) 
 . 08 266 
Netherlands - .053* 
 (.030) 
. 26 153 
 
Portugal   . 103 
 (. 107) 
. 65 99 
Spain  -. 311*** 
 (. 036) 
 . 50 257 
Sweden -. 236 
(. 192) 
 . 21 86 
United Kingdom -.101** 
(. 048) 
 . 14 300 
 
*, **,***  indicate significance levels of 10,5 and 1 percent, respectively 




Table 6.    Estimates of inputs into the banking system subject to VAT (with no  
       input credits available) as a share of VAT-exempt output 
 
 
Method Share in percent 
Sectoral national accounts data for the banking 
sector are used to identify the purchases of 
intermediate inputs and physical capital by the 
entire banking sector. 
These bank inputs are divided by total bank output 
(of exempt and normally taxed financial services) 
to get an estimate of the inputs into bank 
production - as a share of bank output - for which 
no VAT input credits are avaialble. 
Data are for 1998. 
41.7  
In-depth study of 9 financial institutions carried out 
for the European Commission during the 1996-
1998 period.  
This study uses bank-level data to directly identify 
the share of inputs going into the production of 
exempt financial services for which no VAT 
credits are available (even though the producers of 
these inputs were subject to VAT) 
16.5  
Source : Huizinga (2002) 
 
 
 
